ORGANIZATIONAL CREATIVITY VERSUS VESTED INTERESTS: THE ROLE OF ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURS IN THE EMERGENCE OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION AT OXBRIDGE

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Organizational Creativity versus Vested Interests: The Role of Academic Entrepreneurs in the Emergence of Management Education at Oxbridge

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Abstract: As Amabile rightly put it when considering all the organizations she had studied and worked with, “creativity gets killed much more often than it gets supported” (Amabile, 1998). Organizational creativity is even more likely to be killed when an innovative institutional logic seeks to emerge without a corresponding institution, namely within a conservative institution based on strong vested interests. Embedded in a desire for institutional change, ‘change agents’ (Weik, 2011), beyond being individually creative have to orchestrate organizational creativity in order to turn their new idea into an institutionalised innovation. Based on this organizational paradox, the aim of this paper is twofold. First, it contributes to the existing literature dealing with entrepreneurial innovation and organizational creativity. In particular, it seeks to outline which kind of managerial practices foster creativity in a particularly conservative and inert environment. Second, it sheds light on an original comparative case study – the role of organizational creativity in the emergence and institutionalisation of Oxford and Cambridge business schools – that has been underexplored before and that relies on primary data. Based on a historical perspective of everyday organizational life and practices, this research emphasises the role of academic entrepreneurs in organizational changes through the legitimatization of organizational creativity.

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**Introduction**

As Amabile rightly put it when considering all the organizations she had studied and worked with, “creativity gets killed much more often than it gets supported” (Amabile, 1998). Organizational creativity is even more likely to be killed when an innovative institutional logic seeks to emerge without a corresponding institution, namely within a conservative institution based on strong vested interests. Embedded in a desire for institutional change, ‘change agents’ (Weik, 2011), beyond being individually creative have to orchestrate organizational creativity in order to turn their new idea into an innovation accepted by the rest of their community at the institutional level. Overall, this paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature dealing with entrepreneurial innovation and organizational creativity. Essentially, it depicts managerial practices that could foster creativity in a particularly inert and conservative institutional landscape. This research outlines the importance of understanding individual and organizational new practices to shed light on the dynamics of organizational creativity and on its transformation process from its stage of individual creativity to an ‘in-between’ – collective – form of creativity. It is based on an original comparative case study – the role of organizational creativity in the emergence and institutionalisation of Oxford and Cambridge business schools – that has been underexplored before and that relies on primary data and interviews.

In line with its main objectives, the paper falls into three parts. Part I suggests that only few studies have examined the dynamics of organizational creativity in the specific context of inert environments and makes some suggestions to discuss the association of these two concepts further. Part II exposes the cases of the emergence of Oxbridge business schools and the role of their academic entrepreneurs in the process of institutionalisation. The originality of the method lies in the use of a historical perspective of organizational life and practices. Within this interdisciplinary framework (combining history and organization studies), biographies of individuals and groups are seen as an innovative way to capture the organizational conditions for creativity and entrepreneurship. Part III outlines the main findings of the paper.

I. Organizational creativity and conservative landscapes: what the literature has to say on the paradox

The following section consists of an état de l’art built from existing literature on organizational creativity in the context of conservative environments/landscapes (I.1.). The discussion combines two strands in the literature, namely discussions on institutional logics, on the one hand, and ecological approaches of structural inertia, on the other. A way to combine both strands is inspired from the developments concerned with sociotechnical pathways. Then, further analysis on this paradox will be discussed within literature concerned with the evolution of business schools (I.2.).
I.1. Institutional logics, structural inertia and transition pathways

Tensions between innovation and creativity at the individual and organizational level and their development within conservative environments have been discussed by various scholars in different perspectives. The institutional logics perspective, on the one hand, and theoretical developments on innovation and structural inertia, on the other, could be seen as the two main strands relevant to the understanding of this paradox. This section suggests a third perspective, inspired from Geels and Schot (2007), that, to a large extent, reconciles both approaches and that could be qualified as the transition pathways perspective.

First, authors dealing with institutional logics study creativity as general dissatisfaction with the status quo and therefore an expression of a need for institutional change. This dissatisfaction does not lead automatically to change and requires change agents to abolish established logics and to introduce new practices (Weik, 2011). Based on Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of fields, these authors argue that the acceptance of institutional change strongly depends on the location of change agents in a field, defined as a setting in which agents and their social positions are located. The nature of a field initially results from interactions between its specific rules and agents’ dispositions. Change agents are therefore central to the introduction of new institutional logics. The question is to know whether “change agents should be located in the centre of the field because this is where the power lies (e.g. Greenwood and Suddaby 2006) or at the periphery (e.g. Fliest 2001; Misangyi et al. 2008) because this is where dissatisfaction with the status quo manifests itself most easily” (Weik, 2011, p. 304). Since organizational change is apprehended as more than simple reproduction of existing regimes, innovation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for institutional change. In turn, the legitimation process of innovation is inherently determined by power, itself defined by the location of the change agents in a specific field. As a result, individual creativity needed for institutional change is initially an unstable configuration with low performance that needs to move from the periphery to the heart of the field, as a result of power struggles and abolishment of vested interests. Although not explicitly linked with the institutional logics perspective, a related approach consists of developing a political approach to the process and context of strategic leadership in business schools (Fragueiro, Michelini 2014).

Dynamics of innovation in a context of conservative environments have also been studied by authors who rather focus on adaptiveness and survival consequences of different kinds of organizational changes. This trend is exemplified by the pioneer work published by Hannan and Freeman (1984) who, as contributors to the ecological approaches in organization studies, introduced the structural inertia theory. To put it in a nutshell, this theory depicts organizations as rather inert structures for which adaptive response is not only difficult but could be hazardous. The authors consider both internal and external constraints on change and mainly seek to understand whether change could be beneficial for organizations. One of their results shows that the nature of selection processes is such that organizations composed by inert features are more likely to survive than organizations that experience too frequent organizational changes (Ibid., p. 149). To a large extent and as a relevant element for our purpose here, lessons that could be learnt from the structural inertia theory and its extensions, lie in the distinction between the concepts of conservatism and inertia. While conservatism refers to a negative attitude, a resistance to change, that expresses a strong desire for stability
and therefore a perspective of change that is judged as too slow; inertia is rather seen as a strategy that could be beneficial to organizations.

Yet, the question raised in this paper is not to know whether Oxford and Cambridge Universities’ conservatism or inertia were beneficial for change but rather to understand the dynamics between individual creativity, ‘in-between’ creativity and organizational change. To a large extent, there is a gap to fill in the existing literature as only few overlaps could be made between contributions concerned with institutional logics and the ones dealing with structural inertia. Although applied to sociotechnical regime of innovations, Geels and Schot’s work (2007) on transition pathways appears to be an interesting way to reconcile both. Based on a multi-level perspective, the authors show that change comes from interactions between processes at three levels: 1) niche-innovations, 2) socio-technical regimes and 3) sociotechnical landscape. In a similar perspective, Geels and Schot’s typology could be applied to the understanding of the causes of institutional change resulting from the alignments between 1) individual creativity and innovation, 2) organizational creativity based on ‘in-between’ change agents and 3) institutional landscape characterised by deep cultural patterns. Figure 1 illustrates these dynamics and shows the transition from individual creativity to change in the institutional landscape, yet considering, in turn, pressure put on existing regimes by landscape developments. For new institutional logics to emerge, new forms of organizational creativity, abolishing vested interests and introducing new practices, are seen as resulting from the alignments between external influences and individual dissatisfaction of the *status quo*.

The authors argue that “changes at the landscape level usually take place slowly (decades)” (Geels and Schot, 2007, p. 400). This description of the institutional landscape is coherent
with the analysis of institutional developments of business schools and universities. Institutional change in universities is not frequent, mainly because of the size of the organization, its governance system as well as, in most cases, its deep cultural patterns. In fact, some authors argue that “forces for change are frequently distrusted and seen as threats to successful, effective patterns of faculty interaction and self-interest” (Cummings, 1990: 695). Resisting change related issues within university departments is largely stressed in the literature and often seen as the result of “a greater inbuilt organisational conservatism (some would claim it to be inertia) than almost any other kind of organisation” (Gray, 1989: 124).

I.2. Considering Universities as inert entities

The University as a field could be evaluated, if not conservative, at least as an inert entity. More generally, it could be argued that faculties’ desire of stability in their discipline paradigms adds “longevity to evaluation criteria from one cohort of faculty to the next” (Cummings, 1990: 695). At the faculty level, changing curriculum is often considered as inefficient “in terms of the time it takes to adjust courses significantly and for the composite faculty” (Ibid.). It also raised political issues “around the relative power of different faculty interests (e.g., behavioral and non-behavioral) implied in any major curriculum adjustments” and therefore implies “realignments of faculty power and influence” which tend to take time (Ibid.: 696). In addition and more specifically to the Oxbridge context, the crucial role played by the governing bodies (and their distribution across the University), by the Vice-Chancellor and the pro Vice-Chancellors, the democratic role of Congregation which allows academic and administrative staff to vote for (or against) any changes, and therefore the need for a series of reports documenting every step of a possible evolution tend to slow down the decision-making process and every new initiative. The efficiency of such a governing system is not clear and often discussed within the academic community.

John Kay’s personal experience in Oxford led him to argue that this governance was “a constant source – at first of incomprehension, then of frustration – to Mr. Saïd, who spent five years trying to persuade the University to accept a £20 million gift” (Kay, 2000: 4)\(^1\). This general view about the constant frustration when trying to implement a new initiative in Oxford or Cambridge is not shared by everyone. In our interviews, many academics and administrative staff admit that when the University is facing an evolution, “things are not going to happen tomorrow”. As argued by one of the founders of the current Cambridge Centre for Business Research, “the Cambridge story indicates that it is possible to start from virtually nothing and achieve a critical mass, but this takes time” (Keeble, 1989). Each new initiative is discussed and patience is often required when one has the desire to implement a new idea. Interestingly though, one of the interviewees denies the impossibility of individual enterprise in the Oxbridge context and rather, argues that nobody in the governing bodies really has the power to stop an individual initiative. This second view is also defended by Anthony Hopwood who rightly remarked that “it was always going to be complicated here because of the sort of place Oxford is. It’s democratic, it’s lateral, it’s conversational”\(^1\)

\(^1\) John Kay was invited to become the first Director of the Saïd Business School in 1996, five years before it opened its doors on the actual site. To cut the story short, as a result of a series of controversy on the funding and the location of the new school, John Kay resigned suddenly in 1999 after two years of a five-year contract and provoked the publication of a large amount of articles in the media.
This position defends the idea that people with energy, enthusiasm, conviction and views have the power to build a range of new institutions and Centres, as we can count so many of them in both Universities at the moment. These individuals have mobilized resources to transform their initial individual creativity in accepted innovation at the field level.

These two views show that the key factor here is a good understanding of the context in which the business school operates. The governing structure and the time horizons illustrate a more general relevant organisational aspect which is a set of tacit rules, norms and conventions which govern business schools’ organisational change and need to be assimilated by the players who wish to contribute to the institutional logics and to introduce new practices. To a large extent, this is common knowledge in the Oxbridge context and particularly well expressed by John Kay regarding Oxford:

“There was always an element of ritual, of games played according to arcane and implicit rules. The vast majority of participants (…) had spent much of their lives learning the Oxford processes, and did not recognise their peculiar and idiosyncratic nature, although there was a certain pride in the uniqueness of the Oxford way.” (Kay, 2000: 5)

The author goes even further and adds that “when decisions are made, or meaningful discussions take place, it is often in secret and within groups with no formal status” (Ibid.: 8). Unsurprisingly, this tacit set of rules is the result of the history and the deep cultural patterns of any institutional landscape as argued in the transition pathways perspective.

II. Organizational creativity and inert institutional landscapes: the case of the early institutionalisation of Oxbridge Business Schools

This section analyses two sequences of social drama based on initially unstable individual level of creativity that eventually led to a change in the institutional landscape, after a series of failed attempts in the institutionalisation of management education at Oxbridge. The analysis of change dynamics from ‘individual’ to ‘in-between’/ ‘collective’ creativity is particularly emphasised. The method used in these observations is based on historical perspectives of organizational life and practices that deserves to be exposed here.

II.1. Historical perspectives of organizational life and practices: a methodological orientation

While the processual and longitudinal nature of this case prevent the collection of in situ data; the use of historical data is relevant and could still provide evidence of the tacit and relational nature of organizational life and practices (Strati, 1999). This methodological choice echoes a current tendency in organization and management studies that is referred to as the ‘historical turn’ and which stresses the importance of the use of historical data (both quantitative and qualitative) to develop existing theories (Kipping, Üsdiken, 2014). In this context, the purpose of the study is to capture the dynamics of entrepreneurial innovation based on collective creativity located ‘in-between’ academic entrepreneurs who contributed to the emergence and the institutionalisation of the Judge Business School (JBS) and the Saïd Business School (SBS). These dynamics are evaluated through the scrutinization of two “sequences of social
drama”, since “they provide a transparent look at the growth, evolution, transformation, and conceivably, decay of an organisation over time” (Pettigrew, 1979). These two social drama have been chosen as representative of the lateness and the difficult emergence of both business schools. They consist of two episodes located before the creation of the Judge Business School and Said Business School, yet crucial in the process of their institutionalisation.

Based on interviews, unexplored internal reports, and archives, the (micro)analysis of these two “social drama” crucial to the early institutionalisation of Oxford and Cambridge Business Schools sheds light on the practices that foster organizational creativity in an inert institutional landscape. In particular, these two micro episodes contribute to the analysis of the interactions between individual creativity, collective creativity and change in the institutional landscape. The individual trajectory of an academic entrepreneur (or a group of academic entrepreneurs) and his practices are scrutinized to provide a better understanding of the way he successfully moved from an isolated change agent to the mobilization of ‘in-between’ collective creativity based on his evolution in the field and the transformation of his peripheral location to his position where the power lies in the new institutional landscape.

II.2. The early process of institutionalisation of management education at Oxford: From Norman Leyland’s individual creativity to the creation of Templeton College

The emergence of management education in Oxford: Some (brief) key elements

The detailed history of the emergence and institutionalisation of management education in Oxford has been exposed elsewhere (Arena, Dang, 2010) and does not serve much the purpose here. Yet, it constitutes some relevant background information to capture the chaotic and long-lasting process of institutionalisation of the discipline – that was initially perceived as not noble enough to be taught at Oxford – as well as the difficult role of some key academic entrepreneurs in this process. The general rejection of management education was exemplified as early as 1913 with the failed project of an Oxford Business Diploma because of the fear that “too much of the brains and vigour of the country” would be attracted towards the “wealth-amassing career of commerce or business” to the neglect of “the more ennobling careers of the clergyman (…), the lawyer, the doctor, and even the public servant” (Snow, 1991: 16). Overall, the vocational nature of management education was seen as a prejudice against the British cultural heritage and the Victorian period.

It was as late as 1949, when Oxford welcomed the annual Conference of the Federation of British Industry, that the first needs for management education were explicitly formulated, arguing for the creation of educational training programmes in business. This first attempt had to wait to be implemented in practice, as until 1965, there was only the Oxford University Business Summer School (OUBSS), firstly run in 1953, that consisted of a course taught by economists, addressed to businessmen and seen as a way to strengthen bonds between the University and the Industry.
In 1965, after the various attempts to diffuse management education in the University, a group of Oxford dons, including Norman Leyland and Sir Norman Chester gathered a small group of businessmen to indulge in a “notable piece of private enterprise and set up a management centre, if not within the University, at least in Oxford” (Snow, 1995: 5). The administration of the OUBSS was then passed to the newly formed Oxford Centre for Management Studies (OCMS). The OCMS was incorporated in 1965 as a company limited by guarantee but was not recognised as a University institution, yet obtaining the status of an “associated institution”. In the early years of the existence of the Centre, the main programme was a six months Senior Managers Development Programme. This programme was designed for men who were “already senior managers” or who were “likely to become so” (Senior Managers Development Programme, 1970: 1). The curriculum was aimed at executive managers and the lectures were built on existing ones in other social sciences in the university.

When Uwe Kitzinger became the Director of the OCMS in 1980, he claimed that Oxford was a collegiate University and that the “attempt to create a Faculty of Management, which is not dominated by the Faculty of Economics, will never work. We have to turn the Management Centre into a college” (Tricker, 2006: 21). After John Templeton’s benefaction, three years later, Templeton College was born. Templeton was then seen as preserving the independence of the discipline from the University, as had been Leyland’s preferred option. It was as late as 2001, that the current Saïd Business School opened its doors, gradually forcing Templeton to merge with Green College and to stop being the only academic institution in charge of management education in Oxford.

What was “in” Norman H. Leyland? Biographical details and forms of individual creativity

The role of Norman H. Leyland in the emergence of management education illustrates the influence of an academic entrepreneur on organizational creativity, in turn shaping institutional change. Physically, Desmond Graves (2001: 1) described Leyland as “a short man, affected more of a country club approach, the double-breasted navy blazer and black and white hounds-tooth slacks indicating a slightly raffish denizen of the golf club, complete with sallow complexion and fine sandy hair.”

![Picture 1 - Norman Leyland (1921-1982) (Credits: Green-Templeton College, Oxford, with the help of Dorothy Cooke)](image)

His influence could be evaluated through different episodes on a 30 years period, namely between 1950 and 1982. Besides, this period emphasises the transformation process from individual creativity to ‘in-between’ processes of creativity to the level of an
institutionalised innovation. It is worth scrutinizing first what was “in” Norman Leyland, namely specific characteristics that might have led him to develop his individual creativity. Norman Leyland was born near Manchester in 1921. After his enrolment as an officer in the Royal Navy during WWI, his father “drifted into pub-keeping, with its occupational hazard of alcoholism, leaving to his wife the main burden of bringing up the family” (Ibid.). His humble family origins probably gave Leyland the strong ambition to succeed at Manchester Grammar School where he was cycling the 20 miles to and from every day. As his form master put it: “Norman was fully alive to the difficulties which the family were facing and decided that he would learn everything, both for the interest of doing so and so that when he looked for employment, if there were none in some directions, there would be many other avenues open to him”.

By the time WWII broke out, Leyland won a scholarship to study classics at Brasenose College in Oxford and spent his war experience as an aircraftman mending wireless sets in Aden. He returned to Oxford after the War where he read PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) and was appointed as the first Economics lecturer at Brasenose. In 1957, he was elected Bursar in which post he was able “to exercise to the full of his talent for picking both investments and people with great potential before they were generally recognised” (Graves, 2001: 3).

From his appointment as a lecturer in Economics at Brasenose onwards, his institutional involvement in Oxford started in the early 1950s when he became one of the twenty members of the Oxford Economists Research Group (Besomi, 1998) which gathered people of diverse interests and backgrounds with a common focus on various parts of the theory of the firm, and, in particular, a developing interest in competition and prices. The specificity of this group was the method used to study economics of the firm, as it was based on dialogue with businessmen and the confrontation between theoretical insight and empirical facts described by managers2. Unlike most economists of his time, Leyland was very keen on developing strong ties with industrialists and businessmen and was in charge, with Norman Chester, of the conception of the OUBSS in 1953. This summer school was meant to enable ‘leaders of tomorrow’ to make better predictions of the future of the business world (Harryman, undated: 1). Originally known as the ‘Summer School for young business executives’, this four week-course aimed at a closer association between Oxford University and the business world. The course was an immediate success, being quickly oversubscribed, which led to the introduction of interviews by the Committee to select the best applicants. Despite this success and because of the economics-oriented content of the course, various oppositions kept arguing against the establishment of management education at Oxford. Leyland’s initial visionary desire to introduce management education in Oxford was soon stopped by the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies and more precisely by its special committee on management studies which considered that management studies was useful but not needed in Oxford.

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2 As Norman Leyland and George Richardson mentioned about an inquiry concerned with the growth of firms, “sixteen business men came to Oxford over a period of rather less than three years. The interviews were based on a question paper which dealt primarily with the methods of forward planning, with the motives for growth and with the limits to growth.” (Richardson, Leyland, 1964: 1)
It was the persistence of Norman Leyland’s enthusiasm that led him to create a privately funded centre in management studies. The group was to pursue: “studies of interest to management in industry, commerce, finance or public administration” ([Sir Claus Moser, chairman] Report on the Future of Management Studies, 1988: 32). Clifford Barclay, a 50 year old London businessman, who had already made his fortune, offered his financial help to establish business studies at Oxford. However, this financial help would consist only of investing the initial capital, i.e. the fixed costs of the building site. The Oxford Centre for Management Studies was incorporated in 1965 as a company limited by guarantee and first encountered various financial problems. The Centre was not recognised as a University institution, but obtained the status of an “associated institution”. Leyland became the first Director of the Centre, and Chester was made Chairman of the Council (i.e. the Board of Directors). During its early years of existence, the Centre was located in a house on Woodstock Road, before moving three miles South of Oxford, to Kennington.

As many commentators believe, the OCMS, later known as Templeton College would have never existed without Norman Leyland’s visionary actions. His practices were based on his strong desire and persistence in getting management studies established as an academic discipline despite the systematic rejection expressed by Oxford University. Leyland’s various connections with businessmen also served his cause and led to the establishment of management education in Oxford. Leyland died in 1982 just before the OCMS became Templeton College.

What was “in-between” Norman Leyland and others? The shaping of organizational creativity and entrepreneurship

Norman Leyland’s individual creativity – based on his imagination, expertise, motivation, persistence and enthusiasm towards the establishment of management education in Oxford - could not have led to the institutionalisation of the discipline without the help of other human and financial resources. As argued in the previous sections, Leyland was rather at the periphery of the power circle (non-standard economist, non-standard academic since his position of bursar at Brasenose and involved in tensions with some key colleagues in the power structure). To a large extent, what led to the establishment of management education in Oxford could then be seen as the combination of Leyland’s individual skills and vision with his social ties and power base (Weik, 2011). The latter consists of the resources he could mobilise to institutionalise his academic strategic vision. This organizational creativity located in-between ‘change agents’ mainly resulted from Leyland’s association with Norman Chester and Clifford Barclay.

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3 The justification of the Centre, being privately funded was expressed by Norman Leyland, as follows: “[...] we think that administratively the best way of achieving this is by establishing an institution completely independent of University control so as to be free to experiment, yet drawing upon the teaching resources available in Oxford and at the same time contributing a new element to these resources.” (in Graves, 2001: 18).


5 According to Graves, the geographical location of the Centre chosen by Leyland is not a detail in this story. Interestingly, Leyland chose Kennington as it was located on the other side of the ring-road, leading to Oxford University’s main site (L. Arena’s interview with D. Graves, 23rd September 2008). For information, this new site was officially opened by the Duke of Edinburgh on April 30th 1969.

Norman Chester (1907-1986) was Warden of Nuffield College (Oxford) from 1954 to 1978 where he had immense influence on its formative stages and made a major contribution to university administration at Oxford (Johnson, 1987). He is described as wearing “a grey suit with single-breasted jacket fastened jauntily at the bottom button, his ruddy completion, snow-white hair and bushy moustache signifying a working farmer or a patriarchal industrialist” (Graves, 2001: 1).

Norman Chester always believed that prejudice existed against the establishment of business education in Oxford (Chester, 1986: 24) and, perhaps due to his interests in practical aspects of public administration, he was strongly in favour of a new institutional logic to this respect. In 1961, he was chosen by the Board of the Faculty of Social Studies to be a member of the newly formed Special Committee on Management Studies chaired by the economist Sir John Hicks. This Special Committee was formed after an offer made by Mr. Platt, on behalf of an American educational Trust founded by the management consultancy firm McKinsey & Company Inc. to fund a report on the possibilities of developing management studies in Oxford7 (Cf. Appendix 1). After the first meeting of the Committee, its members agreed on two main points. The first was that the enquiry suggested by Platt was needed and “very desirable”; the second that a College Fellow was to be relieved from his college duties for one term to visit the United States and to write a report on Business education in Oxford8. However, the committee did not agree on the source of the funding. While some members were strongly in favour of this grant, some others thought that it could be embarrassing to apply for a grant to an American Foundation “closely associated with a Firm of Management

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7 Mr. J.W. Platt was director of the Shell Transport and Trading Co., as well as being Chairman of the United Kingdom Advisory Council on Education for Management.
8 “He would be responsible for writing a report describing and analysing American and other experience and would be free to express his own views as to the way Management Studies might develop in Britain” (Report of the Committee on Management Studies, Board of the Faculty of Social Studies, 13th March 1961, Oxford Management Studies Archives (OMSA), File 1).
Consultants”. According to them, it might “[...] carry the implication that the University intended to develop management studies, the enquiry being concerned only with the form such development would take” (Ibid.). These members also mentioned the ‘embarrassing publicity’ emerging from such an operation, and suggested finding another way of financing this enquiry.

As an alternative, Norman Chester approached Nuffield College and successfully collected the required sum for the purpose of this investigation into the possibility of developing management studies in Oxford9. In May 1961, John Wright was chosen as the person to be sent to the United-States for three months, in the following autumn. For this occasion, he suggested to the Chairman of the Committee, Professor Hicks, a preliminary outline of the way in which he would plan his enquiry. This letter - reproduced in Appendix 2– raised two main questions the inquiry should be able to answer. The first aimed at testing the extent to which management studies was considered “academically respectable” by Oxford standards. The second took the issue one step further, assuming that Oxford would, in fact, require business education, and posing the question of which type of organisation would then be adequate for introducing management studies. After Wright’s visit, John Hicks organised a meeting to discuss issues arising from his report. The conclusions were that “without additional staff, not much more could be done than broaden the University Business Summer School” (Graves, 2001: 15). As Graves stated, “Management Studies was seen as useful but not really Oxford’s cup of tea, or glass of port” (Ibid.). Oxford’s acceptance of management studies was therefore unusually long-drawn-out.

This episode of failure did not discourage Norman Leyland and Norman Chester who met for the first time in 1960 and who, by the help of a mutual friend, Clifford Barclay, established the Oxford Centre for Management Studies, a privately funded institution. Commentators recall their first meeting as such: “they approached one another rather warily at first and then started giving one another what seemed to me to be dud investment tips. They were clearly fascinated by one another and that was the start of the association” (in Graves, 2001: 4). Clifford Barclay, a common friend and a 50 year old London tax accountant and entrepreneur who had already made his fortune offered his financial help to establish business studies. However, this financial help would consist only of investing the initial capital, i.e. the fixed costs of the building site10. The Oxford Centre for Management Studies was incorporated in 1965 as a company limited by guarantee and first encountered various financial problems. The Centre was not recognised as a University institution, but obtained the status of an “associated institution”11. Leyland became the first Director of the Centre, and Chester was made Chairman of the Council (i.e. the Board of Directors). During its early

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9 Letter from D.N. Chester to the Vice-Chancellor, 10th March 1961, OMSA, File 1.
10 Personal conversation with Desmond Graves, 23rd September 2008.
11 In Oxford, an ‘associated institution’ was associated, but financially independent from the University and cannot deliver any Oxford University degrees. At the time, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies (initially financed by Barclay) along with the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies were also both considered as “associated institutions”. An “associated institution” was not considered as a University ‘entitlement’, but rather as an ‘agent’. Nowadays, these institutions are called ‘Recognised Independent Centres’ – self-governing academic institutions that work in harmony with the University to enrich its field of study’ (The Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies’s website: www.ochs.org.uk). Today, Oxford University gathers The Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, as “Recognised Independent Centres”.

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years of existence, the Centre was located in a house on Woodstock Road, before moving three miles South of Oxford, to Kennington. In 1983, the OCMS was turned into a college and Templeton College was born. Templeton was then seen as preserving the independence of the discipline from the University which had been Leyland’s preferred option. Hence, when the Saïd Business School opened its doors in 2001, management education had already been diffused in Oxford for half a century.

II.2. The early process of institutionalisation of management education at Cambridge: From the Management Studies Research Group’s collective creativity to the creation of the Judge Business School

- The emergence of management education in Cambridge: Some (brief) key elements

At Cambridge, the first attempt – and failure – to develop management studies as an academic discipline resulted from Alfred Marshall’s individual creativity in 1903 (Nishizawa 2002; Arena, Dang 2010). The first lectures in management, mostly “industrial management”, were given from 1954 onwards as part of the Engineering Department, and most engineers thought the subject was a complete waste of time (Pagnamenta, 2009). Yet, the first Diploma in industrial management was created in 1959. At the same time, the Wilson Government urged British universities to engage more with industry which led Cambridge to set up a Science Park (Mott Report, 1969). It was in this institutional landscape that, in 1971, the first Management Studies Research Group was created within the Engineering Department and had a significant influence on the institutionalisation of management education at Cambridge. In 1972, Trinity College officially established Cambridge Science Park and management

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12 According to Graves, the geographical location of the Centre chosen by Leyland is not a detail in this story. Interestingly, Leyland chose Kennington as it was located on the other side of the ring-road, leading to Oxford University’s main site (Personal conversation, 23rd September 2008). For information, this new site was officially opened by the Duke of Edinburgh on April 30th 1969.
education was then strongly shaped by its institutional presence. The emphasis put on engineering activities had two main consequences: first, the type of activity fostered (computing, hardware software) was better adapted to the creation of small firms, which led to the construction of a whole network of university spin outs. Second, the existence and development of this network enhanced the need for management training of new high-tech firms.

In line with these developments, two research centres concerned with management issues opened after the mid-1980s. First, Dr. Chris Johnson, Senior bursar of St John’s College, following a visit to the USA in 1984 proposed the idea to open a Centre for Innovation, as existed in Salt Lake City (Utah) at the time. The Cambridge Phenomenon report (1985) – published by a Cambridge Consulting firm Segal Quince Wicksteed (SQW) – convinced St John’s College that investment in the innovation sector was likely to be successful and the St. John’s Innovation Centre eventually opened in 1987. This independent institution proposed to give support to young start-ups and usually University spinouts. On the same basis, Dr. David Keeble – Fellow in Geography – founded in 1989 with three Cambridge colleagues, the University’s Small Business Research Centre that brought together a group of academics drawn from two different departments: Applied Economics and Geography and was hosted by the Department of Applied Economics. The Centre’s primary function was, yet, closely concerned with management studies issues as it aimed to integrate data on industrial organisation, firm behaviour and organisational change and to apply it to the study of small businesses.

In 1986, the action of Peat Marwick (from KPMG) who decided to generously endow a chair in management studies led to the appointment of Stephen Watson, making him the first Professor of Management at either Oxford or Cambridge. By then, the small Management Studies Research Group started to develop and expressed the growing needs to create a business school, fully integrated in the University. The Cambridge Business School opened its doors in 1990 and after a benefaction from Sir Paul and Lady Judge, whom together with a generous donation from Simon Sainsbury, decided to invest in management education at Cambridge, was renamed the Judge Business School, in 2005.

- What was “in” the Management Studies research group? Biographical (group) details and forms of collective creativity

While Norman Leyland’s individual creativity appeared as the locus of Oxford’s early development in management education, the Cambridge story was somewhat different as creativity emerged directly at the collective level facilitated by the institutional landscape shaped by the Cambridge Phenomenon. This section scrutinizes the role of this Group as an initiator of collective creativity. Dr. Andy Cosh, who was part of the creation of the Group in 1971 remembered:

“For me, the key factor was first there was a young united ambitious group with a very good understanding of the University process and that group was the management group within engineering. (…) The division within the engineering department of which I am still a member is “manufacturing and management”. The management group within the manufacturing and management division is the true developer of the business
school. It is from the management group within the manufacturing and management division that everything emerged from.” (R. Dang’s interview with A. Cosh, 2010).

This small research group initially gathered Eddie Anderson\textsuperscript{13}, Andy Cosh\textsuperscript{14}, Elizabeth Garnsey\textsuperscript{15}, Colin Gill, David Livesey\textsuperscript{16}, Andy Philpott\textsuperscript{17}, Peter Nash, Geoff Walsham\textsuperscript{18} et Stephen Watson\textsuperscript{19}. Most of these academics came from a technical background, often trained in Applied Maths or Engineering and sought to use Management to learn how to run engineering small firms. This could also explain why it appeared natural to develop management education within the Engineering Department. Andy Cosh remembers:

“Elizabeth [Garnsey] and I were two who took the view that the link which we believed was very important between Engineering and the Management School would be stronger and more likely to be retained if we kept a very strong foothold within Engineering. So, we chose as individuals to hold at those within the Engineering Department.” (R. Dang’s interview with A. Cosh, 2010).

Professor Geoff Walsham, who was also part of the creation of the initial Group, noted the presence of strong vested interests – embodied in the “crusty old academic” – and the general hostility towards management education in Cambridge. Despite the inert institutional landscape, the group strongly believed that Management could, as much as Engineering, become a well-established discipline:

“When I arrived in the Engineering Department in 1975 to start teaching Management Studies, there was a small group of lecturers. Very small. Management studies were not perceived as respectable in Cambridge. But then, I heard about the crusty old academic who used to say, apropos Engineering, that Cambridge had never been the same since it started awarding degrees in “plumbing”! (…) It showed my colleagues and I that if we worked long enough, Management Studies too could become respectable”. (Walsham, in Pagnamenta, 2009)

\textsuperscript{13} Eddie Anderson is currently Professor in « Operations Management » at Sidney University. Graduate in Mathematics at Trinity Hall, he then obtained his Ph.D. before being appointed as a lecturer at Cambridge. He played a key role in the phases of emergence of the Judge Business School of which he was the executive director from 1994 to 1995.

\textsuperscript{14} Andy Cosh (Queen’s College) is now Assistant Director of the ESRC Centre for Business Research at Cambridge. Before, he was a researcher in the Applied Economics department and contributed to the creation of the Judge Business School.

\textsuperscript{15} Elizabeth Garnsey (Clare Hall College) is a member of the Centre for Technology Management, part of the Institute for Manufacturing at Cambridge; she is also Professor at the Judge Business School. Before, she was part of the Applied Economics Department and was lecturing Management in the Engineering Department.

\textsuperscript{16} David Livesey (Emmanuel College) is a Lecturer in Economics at Cambridge. Initially graduate from Imperial College in Electrical Engineering, he started being interested in Economics during his Ph.D. In 1975, he is appointed as a Lecturer in Economics in the management studies research group still part of the Engineering Department.

\textsuperscript{17} Andy Philpott is Professor in Operations Management at the University of Auckland since 1986. He obtained his Ph.D. in 1982 at Cambridge where he started lecturing operations management.

\textsuperscript{18} Geoff Walsham is Professor in Management at the Judge Business School. Among other responsibilities in the University, he was Director of the Cambridge MBA.

\textsuperscript{19} Stephen Watson was the first Professor in Management at Cambridge. He obtained his Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics in Cambridge and, in 1971, became a Lecturer in Operations and Statistics in the Engineering Department. In 1978, he became in charge of the Management Studies Research Group et got appointed Professor in Management in 1986. He was the first Director of the Cambridge Business School in 1990.

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This group of first lecturers in Management did not only develop interests for the discipline but fought for the establishment of an independent management studies tripos. Professor Stephen Watson recalls:

“When I became head of the Management Studies Research Group in 1978, we started lobbying for a business school. London, Manchester and Warwick had one; other Universities were following suit. It seemed silly for Cambridge not to do so. The subject was becoming popular. We wanted to acknowledge this by offering a Management Studies tripos separate from Engineering tripos.” (Watson, in Pagnamenta, 2009)

This group’s collective creativity was shaped by the way they seized the opportunity of the emergence of the “Cambridge phenomenon” – i.e. the impact of the explosion of technology, life sciences and service companies forming Cambridge Science Park - which implied that business training was increasingly needed to acquire the appropriate skills to run small engineering firms. In this sense, the Group’s collective creativity emerged as a response to the innovative environment created by Cambridge Science Park. From 1972 onwards, management education at Cambridge slowly and gradually emerged around the Cambridge Science Park’s activities.

The need for the institutionalisation of management education in Cambridge was also coming from industrialists. Matthew Bullock20, Chief Executive at Norwich & Peterborough Building Society, was working for Barclays in the 1980s and thought that “until Oxford and Cambridge started to teach business, university graduates would always regard industry as being below the professions and civil service”. He argues:

20 Matthew Bullock was a long-standing supporter of the project of a Cambridge Business School.
“I was then working for Barclays, and soon realised that though people in these companies were very bright, they had no business training – there was not much cross-over of business ideas into teaching in technology subjects in the university. However a Manufacturing Engineering Tripos was being introduced and it included some materials about the skills needed to run an engineering firm (…)” (Pagnamenta, 2009)

It was in this context, that Matthew Bullock was put in contact with Stephen Watson, who had recently become head of the Management Studies Research Group. Bullock asked for Watson’s help in his project to institutionalise management education at Cambridge. Bullock commented:

“I became an early advisor, and also persuaded Barclays to fund a lectureship in Management. By then, I had started to lend to the technology based companies and I argued that the people creating these firms needed more management training.” (Ibid.)

This group of academic entrepreneurs have created management studies, lobbying and negotiating for the establishment of an independent Management Studies (“Manufacturing Engineering”) tripos. Despite their strong motivation, their expertise in the field and the legitimacy of their claim, their actions were hindered several times by the University. Several factors and practices of creativity can be underlined in the process of emergence of the discipline at Cambridge.

- What was “in-between” the Management Studies Research Group and the rest of the institutional landscape? The shaping of organizational creativity and entrepreneurship

Collective creativity that led to the creation of the Management Studies Research Group was not sufficient to institutionalise management education at Cambridge. As for Norman Leyland in the Oxford case, the group was rather at the periphery of the power circle but successfully managed to mobilise the appropriate resources even when some of them were clearly against the establishment of management education. Four practices could be examined here in their contribution to the establishment of the Cambridge Business School: the interactions with existing (engineering and economics) departments, the creation of a new degree (Manufacturing Engineering tripos) and Chair in Management, the use of independent institutions and how conforming language was used for legitimacy.

As previously exposed, the Management Studies Research Group emerged within the Engineering Department. Hence, to a large extent, its interactions with the members of the Engineering Department were the least hostile ones, although there was some resistance. Andy Cosh remembers: “‘Management is a cancer in the breast of engineering’ (laughs). So, that rather cynical phrase represented the view of some people within engineering who were keen to see us moved out.” (R. Dang’s interview with A. Cosh, 2010). The Department of Engineering rapidly became one of the leading centres of engineering in the world and constituted, therefore, the most visible roots of management education in Cambridge. The content of the Group being mainly oriented towards technology management, it was rather easy for its members – who all had a background in Engineering – to legitimise the way they
were introducing management issues within the Department. As Professor Arnoud De Meyer – Director of the Judge Business School from 2006 to 2010 – argued:

“None of Judge Business School’s growth or achievement over the last 20 years would have been possible without the aid of many supporters both inside and outside the University ranging from the Engineering Department, which gave this school much support in its early phases, to our benefactors.”

Unlike the Oxford case, the institutional landscape shaped by the ‘Cambridge Phenomenon’, appeared as a facilitator of the diffusion of initial collective creativity that emerged at the Group level. The context of the Cambridge Science Park was particularly influential on the research of the newly constituted Centre oriented towards the way entrepreneurship, innovation and enterprise shaped regional economic development. As a result of the creation of the Science Park, the aim of the Department of Engineering was to “address the world's most pressing challenges with science and technology by working in collaboration with other disciplines, other institutions, companies, and the entrepreneurial community and also focus on applied research”\(^1\). Today, the Department consists of six divisions, among which the division “Manufacturing Engineering” enhances the Group's international multidisciplinary research community to develop new understanding of manufacturing technology, operations, strategy and policy, in close partnership with industry. Through its aim to understand and to provide policy tools oriented towards industrial competitiveness, the department is very closely linked with industry\(^2\). This orientation was already present when the Management Studies Research Group emerged in 1971.

The interactions of the Group with the Economics Department were of a different nature. Although at the beginning of the 20th Century, the economist Alfred Marshall was in favour of the establishment of a Management Studies tripos, the general view in the 1970s had clearly changed. Andy Cosh could not be more explicit about this difficult relationship:

“At that time, when we were very close to creating the Business School / the Judge Institute of Management Studies, the main opposition to its creation, was coming, not from engineering who were mixed, some being extremely generous still, but from economists. The main opposition at that time was coming from economics.” (R. Dang’s interview with A. Cosh, 2010)

It is believed that the Economics Department saw management education, and in particular, the establishment of Manufacturing Engineering tripos as a threat. To a large extent, the key actors in the Economics Department at the time were Frank Hahn, a macroeconomics theorist, Steve Satchell, an econometrician and financial economist and Alan Hughes, an economist of the firm and of industry who was also Head of the Applied Economics Department. Andy Cosh remembers:

\(^1\) Cambridge University Engineering Department And Engineers’ Association: http://www-g.eng.cam.ac.uk/ingenuity/.
\(^2\) “The total contract value of the Department of Engineering’s research portfolio is approximately GBP90M. One third of this income comes from collaboration with industry; generating knowledge for companies that can be translated into new and improved products and services. Since the 1970s, the Department has played a significant role in the creation of new companies in and around Cambridge. It is at the center of many University initiatives to provide inspiration, training and support. Since 2001, staff and students founded over 20 spin-out and start-up companies with a total investment of over GBP50M”. [Ibid.]
“Alan was acting Head of applied economics and he was the connection there. As an honest broker. And it is quite interesting that he was also at Sidney Sussex. In the Cambridge system, often these collegiate relationships are very important when you take them into the faculty/department arena because you get a sort of confidence and friendships that make difficult decisions easier to take.” [Ibid.]

A Committee was set up to enquire on the need of a Manufacturing Engineering tripos in Cambridge. This Committee was chaired by an engineer, Donald Green, and composed of Frank Hahn, Steve Satchell and Alan Hughes, on the economics side, and Andy Cosh and Geoff Walsham, on the management side. To Andy Cosh:

“We had a series of meetings at which we got to the position where they were both happy about the intellectual content about what we were trying to do and were reassured that it would not have a large negative impact on their recruitment. That committee sat over a period of time and was really vital. We could not act on to the University until that deal was done with economics.” [Ibid.]

Generally, the main fear expressed by the Economics Department was to lose undergraduates intake to this new course. The Committee converged on a compromise that consisted of the establishment of the Manufacturing Engineering tripos, yet only offered to students on their third year. Despite this compromise, the introduction of the new tripos increased the visibility of management education in the field and Cambridge institutional landscape. It was a strategic way for management to be represented at the undergraduate and graduate levels.

The creation of this new tripos was strengthened by the introduction of the first Chair in Management Studies in 1986, thanks to the financial endowment of Peat Marwick (from KPMG) that led to the appointment of Stephen Watson. To Andy Cosh, getting this Chair was an institutional necessity: “There was a very clear view of what University stood for and how one could bring a new subject into one very conservative institution on the whole. Our first target was the Chair because without a Chair, you didn’t get a seat at many of the tables at which discussions took place and decisions were made.” [Ibid.]

Beyond the interactions with other departments, the Group also expressed its collective creativity through their use of independent institutions in the same way as Norman Leyland used the status of independent institution to establish the Oxford Centre for Management Studies in the 1960s. The successive creation of St John Innovation Centre in 1984, University’s Small Business Research Centre (SBRC) in 1987, and the IfM, Institute for Manufacturing and Management, in 1998, contributed to the gradual acceptance of the discipline without direct confrontation. Andy Cosh strongly believes that the key role in the legitimation of management education in Cambridge was played by Alan Hughes who, as an economist, took the lead of the creation of the SBRC in 1987. The Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre brought together a group of academics drawn from two different departments: Applied Economics and Geography and was hosted by the Department of Applied Economics. Substantial funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) secured the future of the Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre which became in 1994 the Centre for Business Research (CBR). Since then, the centre has made a major contribution to national and international understanding of small firm development and to UK and European Union policy on small businesses. The modern CBR is
still independent of any academic unit. Thus, research on business organisation, innovation and organisational change existed in Cambridge but was studied under the hospice of independent institutions such as St John’s Innovation Centre and the Small Business Research Centre, which later became the centre for Business Research.

Last but not least, another interesting practice of creativity was how the Group mobilised language to reshape the existing institutional frame. When analysing actions of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) shows how conforming is the easiest way of gaining legitimacy. It is simply to position within a pre-existing institutional regime. Conforming actions are adaptations of the new idea to established interests, norms and beliefs. Actions and ideas thus adapted become more consistent with established practices, and fit better into established structures (Oliver, 1991). The Group was then also creative by conforming to the frame of interlocutors. For instance, members of the Group considered the importance of management issues through research policy and industry-related issues. This orientation inherited from the Group was key to later convince Sir Paul Judge to endow the Cambridge Business School, who noted that “in the UK, management studies was seen as administration whereas in the US it was about strategy and managing change”. This choice of meaning was a way to legitimise the discipline for the stakeholders in order to positively influence the resource allocation. Another example could be seen in the choice of the ‘multidisciplinary’ rather than ‘vocational’ qualification of management education. This has been clearly stated by Andy Cosh:

“There is an inherited ambivalence about vocational education at Cambridge. The notion that management is a uniquely vocational discipline within the University of Cambridge is not correct and we were constantly pointing that out to others. The thing about management is not, I think, its vocational aspect, it is more that it is multi-disciplinary and so people just don’t get it. They were asking what was the core paradigm of it, the core disciplinary base. Of course, you had to say there is no single core base; it is the focus that unites the subject, not the disciplinary base.”

[Ibid.]

This action of creativity, by reformulating terms to gain legitimacy actually added considerable value to creativity processes by explicitly modelling the generation of novelty and its recognition as embedded in a network of interactions that influenced both the creators and the audiences that evaluate them (Cattani et al., 2014).

IV. Discussion and concluding remarks

The similarity of both cases leads us to discuss initial results. Overall, this contribution shows that the emergence of the Oxbridge business schools is neither a conscious desire, nor the result of a clear vision provided by academic entrepreneurs of the time. Rather, this work demonstrates that business schools at Oxford and Cambridge emerged from a combination of muddle, confusion, personal antagonism, Oxford and Cambridge’s ways of building new disciplines on existing ones, shortage of academic staff in management, and inherited ambivalence about vocational education. It is argued that management education in both Universities did not emerge from the institutional landscape but rather from different forms of individual and group creativity. Our analysis reinforces the idea that social movements (Cattani et al., 2011) and political conflict (Weik, 2011) explain how major innovative
changes might become accepted in a well-established institution. In particular, the outcome of these movements and conflict are intimately dependent on the determination to break with past practices by stimulating organizational creativity that shows consistency of new institutional logics.

Despite the similarity of both cases, their differences lead us to draw two categories of institutional processes of creativity. In the Oxford case, the field was clearly hostile towards management education and did everything but facilitating its establishment. Interestingly, the legitimation and the gradual acceptance of the discipline went through a process that lied at the periphery of the power circles. Norman Leyland’s individual creativity played a key role in the establishment of new practices as he successfully managed to mobilise Norman Chester (who used Nuffield College to fund a Committee on the establishment of Management Studies) and Clifford Barclay (who provided financial help to fund the Oxford Centre for Management Studies). Yet, the acceptance of the OCMS and later of Templeton College by the University has always been difficult to apprehend, as the Saïd Business School emerged mainly on different grounds. External forces and international pressure to create a Business School in Oxford forced the University to suddenly change its view about management education. Desmond Graves summed up this position as follows:

“The heroes in this story were men and women of passion and they will be painted in bright colours, like Harlequin and Pulcinella. There are no villains, just the negative attitudes and behaviour of the University towards management studies, until it suddenly changes its corporate mind.” (Graves, 2001: 4)

As illustrated in the following picture, there was no initial window to create new opportunities that could have encouraged creativity at any levels. This is probably why it emerged at the periphery and took more time to eventually establish a Centre and then a College in Management that always remained at the periphery of the University.

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23 cf. in particular John Hicks’ attitude and the view expressed by the Special Committee on Management Studies on this matter.
The Cambridge case study illustrates a different type of creativity process, as although initial prejudice against management education existed too, the Cambridge Phenomenon appeared as an initial window for new opportunities and collective creativity to develop. Thus, the Management Studies Research Group initiated collective creativity and successfully managed to change the institutional landscape with the creation of the first Manufacturing and Engineering tripos, the first Chair in Management, St John’s Innovation Centre and the Small Business Research Centre. To a large extent, the Group’s interactions with the engineering and the economics departments have reinforced the idea that “creativity can be organized and led” (Amabile and Khaire, 2008) and even managed (Paris, 2007).
Whereas, most studies focus around the “self” as the privileged locus of creativity, the Cambridge case study is more concerned with the role of social facets of the environment (Amabile 1988, Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin 1993, Glynn 1996) and the influence of initial collective creativity.

Beyond a methodological contribution (historical perspective on organizational life and practices), this paper has shed light on two types of creativity processes developing in two inert environments; yet one of them presenting a window for new opportunities. Based on the study of individual and groups practices, this paper has shown the interactions between individual creativity, collective creativity and institutional change in two specific inert environments.
References


Dear Registrar,

I shall be grateful if you will convey to the Vice-Chancellor a financial offer to Oxford University, which arises out of a luncheon held in St Anthony’s College on 3rd December 1960, at which the Vice-Chancellor and several University personalities interested in Management Studies were present. This offer comes from the McKinsey Foundation for Management Research in the United States, which is an educational trust founded by the prominent firm of Management Consultants, McKinsey & Company Inc.

The Trust is willing to put at the disposal of Oxford University a sum of $10,000, to be used to finance a report on the possibilities of developing Management Studies at Oxford. It has been felt that in view of the diversity of opinions on this subject, Oxford University might wish to make their own careful appraisal of the possibilities and problems of introducing Management Studies at the University, before they are officially initiated.

Although I am authorised to convey this offer to Oxford, I am sure you will understand that the formalities of this educational Trust will have to be observed, i.e., they will require a formal proposal which has to be submitted for the approval of the Trustees.

I am not fully familiar with Oxford procedure in these matters, and if you wish to talk this over me, I shall be happy to come up to Oxford on some mutually convenient date.

Yours truly,

James W. Platt.
Appendix 2 – Letter from Mr. Wright to the Chairman of the Board on Management Studies, Professor Sir John Hicks, 25th May 1961, (OMSA, File 1)

As I see it, there are two major questions to be answered. The first is: ‘Is there, within the general field of management studies, a substantial and unified collection of subjects that is also academically respectable when judged by our Oxford standards?’ The second is ‘What type and scale of facilities would have to be provided if these studies were introduced here?’

Before the Committee and university can answer these, it ought to be provided with answers to questions of the kind listed below. The list is not intended to be comprehensive, and there is inevitable over-lapping.

A. Questions relevant to ‘academic respectability’ to be asked about individual management subjects:

1. Can the teachers of the subject indulge in genuine academic research? Do they do so?
2. Would their interests cross-fertilize with those of present members of the University?
3. Is the subject ‘genuine’ is it large enough and sufficiently well provided with books to be taught and examined in the Oxford manner? i.e. is it well enough developed for examiners to be able to set papers which do not degenerate into requests for the performance of a limited repertoire of model answers?
4. What sort of intellectual spirit does the subject foster amongst those who study it?

B. Questions relevant to facilities to be asked about particular subject and also about possible courses (programmes’ in American):

1. Can the subjects be taught on a tutorial/lecture system or do they need the provision of more continuous classes and seminars?
2. Do these or other factors set an economic minimum to the scale of the course to be provided?
3. To what extent would the appointment of specialists be necessary?
4. Could the subject be organized within the system of colleges and existing institutions?

I believe that it is only by finding out the answers to lesser questions of this kind that we can give an answer to the greater. These lesser questions themselves are not all matters on which one man can come to definite conclusions, but they are matters on which a good deal of quite intensive detailed investigations would need to be made. One wants to see the subjects being taught, to see the work that is produced, and have plenty of time to absorb the intellectual atmosphere. I hope that about six weeks would be long enough to do this in a few US business schools selected for their quality and their contrast: Harvard, MIT, Columbia, Carnegie Tech., Cornell, and possibly Chicago.
2015-01  Laetitia Chaix & Dominique Torre  
The Dual Role of Mobile Payment in Developing Countries

2015-02  Michaël Assous, Olivier Bruno & Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand  
The Law of Diminishing Elasticity of Demand in Harrod’s Trade Cycle (1936)

2015-03  Mohamed Arouri, Adel Ben Youssef & Cuong Nguyen  
Natural Disasters, Household Welfare and Resilience: Evidence from Rural Vietnam

2015-04  Sarah Guillou & Lionel Nesta  
Markup Heterogeneity, Export Status and the Establishment of the Euro

2015-05  Stefano Bianchini, Jackie Krafft, Francesco Quatraro & Jacques Ravix  
Corporate Governance, Innovation and Firm Age: Insights and New Evidence

2015-06  Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Sébastien Duchêne & Eric Guerci  
Testing Quantum-like Models of Judgment for Question Order Effects

2015-07  Christian Longhi & Sylvie Rochhia  
Long Tails in the Tourism Industry: Towards Knowledge Intensive Service Suppliers

2015-08  Michael Dietrich, Jackie Krafft & Jolian McHardy  
Real Firms, Transaction Costs and Firm Development: A Suggested Formalisation

2015-09  Ankinée Kirakozian  
Household Waste Recycling: Economics and Policy

2015-10  Frédéric Marty  
Régulation par contrat

2015-11  Muriel Dal-Pont Legrand & Sophie Pommet  
Nature des sociétés de capital-investissement et performances des firmes : le cas de la France

2015-12  Alessandra Colombelli, Jackie Krafft & Francesco Quatraro  
Eco-Innovation and Firm Growth: Do Green Gazelles Run Faster? Microeconometric Evidence from a Sample of European Firms

2015-13  Patrice Bougette & Christophe Charlier  
La difficile conciliation entre politique de concurrence et politique industrielle : le soutien aux énergies renouvelables

2015-14  Lauren Larrouy  
Revisiting Methodological Individualism in Game Theory: The Contributions of Schelling and Bacharach

2015-15  Richard Arena & Lauren Larrouy  
The Role of Psychology in Austrian Economics and Game Theory: Subjectivity and Coordination

2015-16  Nathalie Oriol & Iryna Veryzhenko  
Market Structure or Traders’ Behaviour? An Assessment of Flash Crash Phenomena and their Regulation based on a Multi-agent Simulation

2015-17  Raffaele Miniacci & Michele Pezzoni  

2015-18  Claire Baldin & Ludovic Ragni  
L’apport de Pellegrino Rossi à la théorie de l’offre et de la demande : une tentative d’interprétation
2015-19  **Claire Baldin & Ludovic Ragni**
*Théorie des élites parétienne et moment machiavélien comme principes explicatifs de la dynamique sociale : les limites de la méthode des approximations successives*

2015-20  **Ankinée Kirakozian & Christophe Charlier**
*Just Tell me What my Neighbors Do! Public Policies for Households Recycling*

2015-21  **Nathalie Oriol, Alexandra Rufini & Dominique Torre**
*Should Dark Pools be Banned from Regulated Exchanges?*

2015-22  **Lise Arena & Rani Dang**
*Organizational Creativity versus Vested Interests: The Role of Academic Entrepreneurs in the Emergence of Management Education at Oxbridge*