2011 - 2012

Jeudi 29 septembre 2011 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : An End to Consensus? Legal Origins Theory and the Selective Impact of Corporate Law Reform on Financial Development

 We synthesise the results of an emerging body of work, both theoretical and empirical, which provides a critique of the legal origins hypothesis. We use recently created datasets measuring legal change over time in a sample of 25 developing, developed and transition countries to see whether law reform has an impact on financial development. We find that increases in shareholder protection contribute to stock market growth in the common law world and in developing countries, but not in the civil law world. We also find evidence of reverse causation, with financial development triggering legal changes in the developing world. We consider a number of reasons for the selective impact of law reform, focusing on the endogeneity of the legal system to its economic context, and on resulting complementarities between legal and financial institutions.

Jeudi 6 octobre 2011 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : Are Competitive Markets Self–Regulating? Issues from the History of Economic Dynamics

Résumé : Cet article a été motivé par les récurrentes polémiques sur le fonctionnement des marchés concurrentiels dans les économies capitalistes et les avantages (ou les inconvénient) de l'interventionnisme. L'histoire des doctrines économiques peut éclairer ce problème et faciliter une approche non-idéologique. Nous réexaminons l'idée de la « main invisible » et critiquons certaines interprétations de l'ouvrage d'Adam Smith. Cela nous amène à réfléchir sur les principes fondamentaux de la théorie moderne de l'équilibre économique et sa stabilité et à revoir quelques résultats analytiques essentiels. Nous examinons la montée du « fondamentalisme de l'équilibre » et en discutons les plus importantes critiques. Nous concluons par quelques réflexions sur la résurgence de l'analyse du déséquilibre dans ses différentes versions.

Jeudi 13 octobre 2011 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : Telemedicine: A practice-based approach to technology

Résumé : Telecardiological consultancy, enabling distant consultation between cardiologist and the general practitioner in the presence of the patient and relying on a technological infrastructure, is a new medical working practice. This article proposes a practice-based approach in order to study it as an object emerging from a local ecology of human and non-human. An analytical framework proposes three interpretative lines: a reading of practice 'from outside' (as a patterned set of activities), a reading 'from inside' (as knowing-in-practice) and a reading as a social practice (as a 'doing' of society). The article analyses the discursive practices involved in a month of telecardiological consultancies in order to understand the effects of this new practice in a Western health care context. One of these meanings is that, as telecardiology comes into use, it is inscribed more in the social practice of reassurance than in the medical one of preventing and dealing with emergencies.

Jeudi 27 octobre 2011 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : Patterns and Effects of Entry in U.S. Airline Markets

Résumé : We use T-100 traffic data and DB1B fare data from the U.S. Department of Transportation to identify patterns and effects of entry by network carriers and low-cost carriers in non-stop U.S. airline markets. For the sample period from 1996 to 2009, we find that entry activity of low-cost carriers did not only experience significant absolute increases but also led to substantial fare reductions. As route entries by network carriers do not have comparable effects, the existence and expansion of low-cost carriers must be considered as the main driver of competition in the domestic U.S. airline industry.

Jeudi 24 novembre 2011 14h, salle Picasso (séminaire interne)

Titre : "Distrust and barriers to international trade in food products: an analysis of the US — Poultry dispute"

Résumé : The US - Poultry dispute arbitrated by the WTO, opposing China to the US, was raised by the US decision to stop equivalence regime procedures for Chinese poultry. China claimed that this decision was not compatible with the Sanitary and Phytosani- tary Agreement's exigencies and resulted also in discrimination, contradicting the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligation of the GATT 1994 Agreement. The possibility that the reasoning of the Panel in this dispute was based on the reasoning developed in earlier SPS cases suggests that this dispute doesn't provide new perspectives for SPS cases. However, this paper argues, applying economic analysis, that the US { Poultry case is original. Considering this dispute in the context of a trust game provides a dierent interpretation that highlights the importance of a country's trust on the insti- tutional quality of its trading partner. The main result of the model is to show that a risk assessment focusing on the social and institutional conditions of the implementa- tion of the Chinese safety regulation in order to justify distrust, should be considered a proper way to defend the US constraining measure. We extend the economic analysis to MFN treatment using the concepts of positive externalities and reciprocity to establish discrimination.

Jeudi 1er décembre 2011 14h, salle Picasso (séminaire coorganisé avec l'OFCE)

Titre : Financial Constraints and Foreign Market Entries or Exits: Firm Level Evidence from France

Résumé : Cet article étudie l’'effet des contraintes de financement sur les changements dans le nombre de marchés sur lesquelles les frmes exportent. Un modèle est développé dans lequel un moindre accès aux financements externes, ou en manque de ressources internes, détériorent la capacité à financer les coûts d’'exportation récurrents et réduisent la probabilité de maintient sur les marchés étrangers. De plus, les contraintes financières sont un obstacle à l'expansion des exportations parce qu'’elles réduisent la capacité à payer les coûts d’'accès à des nouveaux marchés ; de ce fait elles conduisent les firmes à éviter la perte de destinations d’'exportation. Pour tester les prédictions de ce modèle, nous utilisons une base de données longitudinale combinant une information sur les destinations des exportations des firmes et des variables de contraintes financières au niveau individuel. Nous obtenons deux résultats. Premièrement, les contraintes de financement ont un impact négatif sur le nombre de nouvelles destinations d'’exportations. Deuxièmement, les contraintes de financement sont associées à une probabilité plus élevée de sortie des marchés d’'exportations ; ceci étant compatible avec des contraintes qui limiteraient principalement la capacité à payer les coûts d’'exportation récurrents.

Jeudi 5 janvier 2012 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : The performativity of accounting language Crossing field studies

Résumé : The metaphor of accounting as a language has inspired numerous studies that deal with the role of accounting (in a broad sense of the word, i.e. financial accounting, auditing, cost accounting, management control, performance measurement) in organizations and society (Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood and Miller, 1994). These studies suggest that accounting language is not a transparent medium that allows communication about an objective reality composed of financial outcomes, organizational structures, industrial models, division of labor, and so on. Rather, it produces, constitutes or perform the financial reality that people perceive and experience to be real (Hines, 1988; Morgan, 1988). Paralleling research that shows how the scientific discourse of economics constitutes – or performs- 'the economy' (see Callon et al., 2007; Granovetter, 1985; MacKenzie and Millo, 2003; Polanyi, 1944/1957), these studies insight deeply current development and paradoxes of forms of counting, calculating, auditing…in modern societies.

Lien : Bertrand_Faure_2012.pdf

Jeudi 19 janvier 2012 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : A cross-country experimental comparison of preferences for redistribution

Résumé : We examine experimentally individual preferences for redistributions in the US, Italy, and Norway. We decompose demand for redistribution due to luck vis-à-vis individual merit, and study how they are affected by individual and social characteristics. Experimental subjects made four different decisions on how much earning redistribution they wanted to implement in their group starting from a given initial distribution of earnings. The first decision measured preferences for inequality under a condition of impersonality. The second and third decisions were made behind a "veil of ignorance", whereas the fourth decision was taken knowing one's position in the earnings scale. Ambiguity and risk aversions were measured in an independent set of decisions. Between-country differences are sizable. Norwegian subjects were generally the most redistributive of the three, and the US subjects the least redistributive. Italian subjects seemed more willing to accept inequality differences due to individual merit than others. Conversely, Norwegian subjects demanded high levels of redistribution regardless of how inequality had been generated. Experimental redistribution is significantly higher in Norway than Italy, in spite of the two samples holding comparable views over social mobility. This calls for a re-examination of existing theories that see beliefs on mobility as the main explanation of demand for redistribution.

Jeudi 2 février 2012 14h30, salle Picasso (séminaire coorganisé avec l'OFCE)

Titre : Inégalités et mondialisation

Jeudi 16 février 2012 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : Ramsey Equilibrium with Endogenous Labor Supply and Borrowing Constraints: Existence, Bubbles, Efficiency

Résumé : We address the fundamental issues of existence and efficiency of a Ramsey equilibrium with heterogenous discounting, elastic labor supply and borrowing constraints. In the first part, we prove the equilibrium existence in a truncated bounded economy through a fixed-point argument by Gale and Mas-Colell (1975). This equilibrium is also an equilibrium of any unbounded economy with the same fundamentals. The proof of existence is eventually given for an infinite-horizon economy as a limit of a sequence of truncated economies. Our general approach is suitable for applications to other models with different market imperfections. In the second part, we show the impossibility of bubbles in a productive economy and we give sufficient conditions for equilibrium efficiency.

Jeudi 23 février 2012   14h30,  salle Miro
(séminaire coorganisé avec l'OFCE)

Titre : Perspectives à court et moyen terme des économies européennes

Jeudi 15 mars 2012, 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : R&D and Employment: Some Evidence from European Microdata

Résumé : After discussing theory regarding the consequences of technological change on employment and surveying previous microeconometric literature, our aim with this paper is to test the possible job creation effect of business R&D expenditures, using a unique longitudinal database covering 677 European manufacturing and service firms over the period 1990-2008. The main outcome from the whole sample dynamic LSDVC (Least Squared Dummy Variable Corrected) estimate is the labour-friendly nature of companies' R&D, the coefficient of which turns out to be statistically significant, although not very large in magnitude. However, the positive and significant impact of R&D expenditures on employment is detectable in services and high-tech manufacturing but absent in the more traditional manufacturing sectors. This means that we should not expect positive employment effects from increasing R&D in the majority of industrial sectors. This is something that should be borne in mind by European innovation policy makers having employment as one of their specific aims.

5 avril 2012 14h, salle Picasso

Titre : The Equivalence of Strict Liability and Negligence Rule: A « Trompe l'œil » Perspective

Résumé : This paper analyzes the difficulties of comparing the respective effectiveness of two among the most important liability regimes in tort law: rule of negligence and strict liability. Starting from the standard Shavellian unilateral accident scheme, I show that matching up liability regime on their capacity to provide the highest level of safety is ineffective. This demonstration lies on two components. The first one gathers some results drawn from literature that introduces uncertainty. The second one takes into consideration the beliefs of agents and their aversion to ambiguity. The model applies uncertainty to the level of maximum damage. This demonstration reinforces the previous result. Hence, both regime applies on specific tort question and comparing their individual efficiency needs to call for other components as the transaction costs associated to the burden of evidence, the fairness between victims and injurers, etc.

Jeudi 12 avril 2012 14h30, salle Picasso

Titre : Combined Effects of Load Factors and Booking Time on Fares: Insights from the Yield Management of a Low-Cost Airline

Résumé : Based on two strands of theoretical research, this paper provides new evidence on how fares are jointly affected by in-flight seat availability and purchasing date. As capacity-driven theories predict, it emerges that fares monotonically and substantially increase with the flights occupancy rate. Moreover, as suggested in the literature on intertemporal price discrimination, the adoption of advance purchase discounts is widespread as the departure date nears, but it may be part of a U-shaped temporal profile, where discounts are preceded by periods of relatively higher fares. Finally, the intervention of yield management analysts appears to play a substantial role.

Jeudi 19 avril 14h30, salle Picasso (séminaire interne)

Titre : Somebody May Scold You! A Dictator Experiment

Résumé : In this contribution, we investigate the effects of ex post verbal written feedback and observation from a third-party in a dictator game. We first test the impact of observation by a third-party on dictators' propositions. We then test whether an anticipated feedback from the observer consisting of a statement of degree of (dis)satisfaction selected from a closed-form questionnaire affects the generosity of the dictator as compared to situations with observation but no feedback and with no observation. Curiously, it appears that observation coupled with verbal ex post communication has a significant impact on dictators' propositions, while no significant effect is found for observation alone. This suggests that observation by others matters only if it complemented by a sort of judgment.

Jeudi 10 mai 2012 14h, salle Picasso (séminaire interne)

Titre : From Bayesianism and Frequentism to Market Experiments and Behavioral Economics: The 1996 Controversy between Kahneman, Tversky, and Gigerenzer

Résumé : In 1996 the Psychological Review published an article of Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky – two psychologists – responding to nearly a decade of criticisms addressed against their work by Gerd Gigerenzer – another psychologist. Gigerenzer commented on this answer in an article published in the same volume, and Kahneman & Tversky (K&T thereafter) responded to this article by a postscript1 . This controversy was entirely about psychology, not about economics. K&T were yet known for their Prospect Theory, a descriptive theory of choice under risk that had a great influence in microeconomics2; but neither K&T's ( paper nor Gigerenzer's ( answer made references to K&T's famous Prospect Theory paper. Still, we claim that this purely psychological controversy permits to understand methodological, theoretical and normative concerns that are actually playing a prominent role in recent mainstream economic approaches. Particularly, our paper suggests that analyzing this debate is of interest for both 1) the recent history of microeconomics, and 2) the issue of interdisciplinarity in economics...

Mardi 15 mai 2012 14h, salle Miro

Titre : Recent qualitative advances on hybrid organizations: Taking stock, looking ahead

Résumé : Where does the study of hybrids stand at present? Through a review of existing research, this paper provides a number of contributions to the literature on inter-organizational relations, or hybrids. For one, basing ourselves on the traditional theories used in the study of hybrids, we propose an integrative definition and classification of hybrids. We classify explanations of the formation, functioning and implications of hybrids using agency theory, property rights theory, transaction cost economics and the resource-based view. For another, based on a review of recent qualitative studies on hybrids, we extend our classification to include the more recent theories used in the study of hybrids. These recent studies combine the traditional theories on hybrids with network and evolutionary theories, and literature on strategy and trust. Our review also provides new insights on the dynamics and environment of hybrids, and suggests avenues for future research.

Mardi 22 mai 2012 14h, salle Miro

Titre : Incentives, opportunism and behavioral uncertainty in electricity industries

Résumé : Many theories on the economics of the firm assume that economic actors are opportunistic. The focus of these theories is on the mitigation of the uncertainty that economic actors may behave opportunistically, and on the ability of contracts and governance structures to reduce this behavioral uncertainty. Previous studies did not analyze the properties of behavioral uncertainty in detail, nor did they emphasize the empirical verification of behavioral uncertainty with revealed opportunistic behavior. This article addresses both of these lacunae in the literature by focusing on incentive alignment between parties to information transactions and on empirical proof of opportunistic behavior. When a context aligns incentives, contracting parties do not behave opportunistically. When a context does not align incentives, contracting parties strategically distort or disguise information. A study of 239 regulatory decisions on dispute resolutions and enforcements of energy laws in the Dutch and French electricity industries confirms these propositions.

Mardi 29 mai 2012 14h, salle Miro

Titre : Involuntary Governance Choices in the Electricity Industry

Résumé : Governmental liberalization policies provide a natural experiment for examining firms' preferences for governance structures when adapting, voluntarily or involuntarily, to regulatory changes in the business environment. We investigate the involuntary governance choices of the energy firms in the Dutch electricity industry after the European electricity directives of 1996 and 2003. The governance choices are involuntary, because the directives prohibit the energy firms to organize their electricity transactions in the comparatively efficient governance solution of the vertically integrated firm. After the implementation of the directives, the energy firms claim to prefer quasi-integration instead of the market that is prescribed by the directives and national laws for the electricity industry. In this paper, we use transaction cost economics to study the governance structures. We complement the standard transaction cost analysis by incorporating adaptation as the process of adjustment between governance structures that can explain the involuntary governance choices. We explain how suboptimal governance choices are made, on the basis of both adaptation costs and misalignment costs. We present evidence on the relation between the preferred governance structures, expected adaptation costs and expected misalignment costs, based on expert information.

Mercredi 30 mai 2012 10h, salle Miro

Titre : The Financial Accelerator in an Evolving Credit Network

Résumé : We model a credit network characterized by credit relationships connecting (i) downstream (D) and upstream (U) firms and (ii) firms and banks. The net worth of D firms is the driver of fluctuations.The production of D firms and of their suppliers (U firms) in fact,is constrained by the availability of internal finance - proxied by net worth - to the D firms. The structure of credit interlinkages changes overtime due to an endogeneous process of partner selection,which leads to the polarization of the network. At the aggregate level, the distribution of growth rates exhibits negative skewness and excess kurtosis. When a shock hits the macroeconomy or a significant group of agents in the credit network a bankruptcy avalanche can follow if agents' leverage is critically high. In a nutshell we want to explore the properties of a network-based financial accelerator.

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